Federal Reserve : Central banking and the merits of a federated structure by Shannon McKay & Kimberly Zeuli
T
he recent recession has caused many to question
the role of the Federal Reserve. The reforms under
debate in Congress could significantly alter the 
regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Reserve or change
the current decentralized nature of Fed policymaking.
Many proposals, however, often do not consider why the
Federal Reserve’s policymaking process might be well-
served by its organizational structure as a federated system. 
The  logic  of  a  decentralized  Fed  is  an  important 
framework  for  analyzing  competing  reform  proposals.
Additionally, federated structures are not unique to central
banks. The value added to other types of institutions and
industries can highlight the advantages of a decentralized
Federal Reserve System. 
What is a Federated Structure? 
The federated structure is prevalent in many sectors of the
economy: agriculture, wholesale purchasing, and nonprofit
service organizations. In agriculture, federated cooperatives
have a long history of strategic importance in the United
States as well as other countries and often dominate a signif-
icant share of their markets. For example, CHS Inc. is one of
the largest farm supply businesses in the United States and 
is  a  Fortune  100  company.  Internationally,  Colombia’s
National Federation of Coffee Growers (the owner of the
famous Juan Valdez logo) dominates their coffee market. In
the  nonprofit  sector,  the YMCA  and  the  Red  Cross  are
some of the largest community service organizations in the
United States and the world.
In a federated structure, a group of autonomous organi-
zations with local or regional representation are part of an
alliance under the umbrella of a national- or international-
level  organization.  The  local  or  regional  organizations 
(often  referred  to  as  affiliates)  retain  independence  over
their internal affairs and are at least partially self-governing.
Certain  powers  are,  however,  ceded  to  the  national  or 
centralized coordinating body, which is wholly or partially
owned by all of the affiliates. 
In  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  there  are  12  semiau-
tonomous  regional  Reserve  Banks,  each  operating  in  a
distinct geographical territory, referred to as a district. The
Board of Governors, which is a federal government agency,
provides general supervision and regulatory oversight of the
operations  of  the  regional  Banks.  The  Board  comprises
seven governors appointed by the President of the United
States. The Board of Governors and five regional Bank pres-
idents  constitute  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee
(FOMC),  which  sets  the  nation’s  monetary  policy.  The
Board  also  approves  the  appointments  of  presidents  and
first vice presidents at each Bank. Each regional Bank has its
own Board of Directors representing member banks and the
general public. The regional Banks implement other func-
tions  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  including  payment
processing,  currency  distribution,  bank  exams,  discount
window operations, and certain bank-
ing operations for the U.S. Treasury.
The regional Banks earn their pri-
mary  revenue  from  interest  on
securities and fees for services provid-
ed  to  depository  institutions.  Service
fees are set at the System-level so as to
cover the costs of providing these serv-
ices. The net revenue is first allocated
as fixed dividend payments to member
banks and then to maintaining an ade-
quate  surplus.  The  remainder,  which
has historically been approximately 95




When it was created in 1913, the struc-
ture of the Federal Reserve System was
a  political  compromise.  The  original
idea  of  some  legislators  was  to  con-
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centralized) bank. However, the country’s relatively recent
experiences with the First and Second Banks of the United
States (1791-1811 and 1816-1836) tainted the public’s opinion
of  a  central  banking  system.  As  a  result,  policymakers
explored  decentralized  banking  systems  and  central  bank
models in other countries. 
One difficulty in imposing a truly centralized structure
on the banking industry in the early 20th century was relat-
ed to the industry’s size. A survey taken on April 28, 1909,
reported 22,491 banks in existence in the United States and
its island possessions. At the time, the banking industry was
composed  of  national  banks,  state  banks,  mutual  savings
banks, stock savings banks, private banks, and loan and trust
companies.  National  banks  are  distinct  from  state  banks
because their charter comes from the federal government
rather  than  a  particular  state.  The  federal  government 
thus had regulatory control over the national banks, but not
state banks. 
In the banking industry of 1909, state banks vastly out-
numbered  national  banks  (11,319  and  6,893,  respectively).
However, in terms of assets, national banks dominated state
banks. The national banks that participated in the survey
reported a total of more than $9.3 billion in assets compared
to roughly $3.3 billion for the state banks. This difference in
assets partly reflects the role of national banks as depository
institutions for bonds from the U.S. Treasury. 
The  banking  industry’s  characteristics  also  varied  by
geography. In the New England and Eastern states, the num-
ber of national banks dwarfed the number of state banks.
The  opposite  trend  prevailed  in  the  Southern,  Middle
Western, Western, and Pacific regions. 
Decentralization was the predominant characteristic of
the U.S. banking industry. Yet the banking system reforms
designed by Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, which arose out of
the work of the National Monetary Commission of 1908 to
1912, advocated a more centralized system than what was
finally  passed  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913.  The 
purpose of the commission was to study the existing U.S.
financial  system  and  its  history  as  well  as  look  to  other
nations  for  ideas  on  appropriate  currency  and  banking
reforms  that  would  prevent  or  lessen  the  damage  from
events like the Bank Panic of 1907. Senator Aldrich, chair-
man  of  the  commission  and  a  Republican  from  Rhode
Island,  politicized  the  reform  effort  by  identifying  the
Republican Party as the supporters of a central bank plan.
The Democratic Party platform of 1912 opposed a central
bank.  The  Aldrich  Plan  introduced  in  the  Senate 
on Jan. 9, 1912, would have established a “National Reserve
Association”  which  was  “strictly  a  bankers’  bank  with
branches  under  the  control  of  separate  directorates 
having  supervision  over  the  rediscount  operations  with
member banks.” 
The element of centralization in the Aldrich Plan came
from the establishment of one central body that controlled
the system and a membership board that would be chosen by
both the banking sector and the federal government. The
system was to be comprised of 15 districts with a branch of
the  National  Reserve  Association  in  each  district.  The
Executive Committee of the National Reserve Association
would  be  in  charge  of  operations.  However,  the  banking
industry would be given more of a voice on the board than
government  officials.  In  recognition  that  his  plan  leaned
more heavily to banking interests, Aldrich sought to mini-
mize this dominance by limiting the powers of the National
Reserve  Association  and  spreading  membership  on  the
directorate  board  across  the  geographic  banking  regions.
Aldrich’s approach was described as “fifteen chapels united
by a solid dome.” 
Because  of  the  political  climate  of  an  election  year,
Aldrich’s bill never received full congressional consideration.
The congressional and presidential elections of 1912 placed
the Democrats as the party in power both in the Congress
and the White House and they began to fashion their own
banking and currency reform legislation. The Democratic
effort  was  spearheaded  by  Congressman  Carter  Glass  of
Virginia and Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma. Both men
represented a departure from Senator Aldrich whose work
on banking reform was viewed as tainted by moneyed inter-
ests because John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the son of the founder
of Standard Oil, was his son-in-law. Glass’ background was in
journalism as a newspaper reporter, editor, and owner while
Owen had worked as a teacher and lawyer before organizing
the  First  National  Bank  of  Muskogee,  a  small  bank  in
Oklahoma. 
To ensure its passage, any piece of banking reform legis-
lation put forth by the Democrats needed William Jennings
Bryan’s  stamp  of  approval.  Bryan,  the  Secretary  of  State
appointed by President Wilson in 1913, was born and raised
in rural Illinois and Nebraska and represented the latter as a
U.S. Representative between 1891 and 1895. His Democratic
Party  base  was  comprised  of  newly  arrived  immigrants,
agrarian  reformers,  and  supporters  of  women’s  suffrage.
William Jennings Bryan became an overnight sensation in
Democratic circles while still in his 30s and was that party’s
nominee for president in 1896, 1900, and 1908. His platform
included  breaking  up  perceived  monopolies,  fighting  big
banks and railroads, and generally promoting populist ideas. 
In 1896, Bryan was also the Populist Party’s presidential
nominee. That party, established in 1892, grew out of the
Panic of 1873, which began in September of that year with
the failure of Jay Cooke & Company, an investment bank
heavily involved in the financing of railroad expansion. Its
failure triggered the collapse of other banks which led to the
temporary closure of the New York Stock Exchange. The
effects of the panic were felt across the nation and led to the
Depression of 1873-1879. During this period, a constrained
money supply lead to deflation resulting in plummeting val-
ues  for  agricultural  prices.  Many  farmers  believed  the
government’s monetary policy was being controlled by the
large banks and industrial monopolists on the East Coast.
They  strongly  advocated  the  abolition  of  national  banks 
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bankers. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Act  that  was  ultimately  passed 
in 1913 allowed between eight and 12 regional Banks. This
approach gained support for two reasons. First, the system
needed  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  the  economic  conditions
occurring in the different regions of the country, particular-
ly with regard to setting discount rates. Each regional central
bank could set the appropriate rate for its region rather than
trying to have one central bank maintain several different
discount rates. Second, there was a desire to break up or
weaken the control that New York banks had on the money
market. The ability for another “money trust” to develop
and  dominate  the  financial  sector  would  be  curtailed  if 
economic power was more decentralized across the country. 
The Federal Reserve Act also departed from its predeces-
sors in terms of the distribution of power in the system. The
Aldrich Plan was severely criticized for the perceived domi-
nance that business interests could have over the National
Reserve Association, so the Federal Reserve Act went in the
opposite  direction  by  including  a  stronger  voice  for  the 
federal government in the system. The government’s influ-
ence is embodied in the fact that the members of the Federal
Reserve Board are nominated by the President and subject
to congressional approval. 
The interjection of politics into the Board’s membership
was  one  of  the  necessary  changes  made  in  order  to  gain
Bryan’s support for the Federal Reserve Act. As Bryan wrote
to Glass in August 1913, “the bill provides for Government
control of the issue of this money…This is another distinc-
tive  triumph  for  the  people,  one  without  which  the
Government issue of the money would be largely a barren
victory.” The  Republicans  and  the  banking  industry  were
opposed to such governmental interference in banking. As
Glass wrote at the time, “I also told the President his propo-
sition would put the whole scheme into politics and that he
could  not  expect  a  powerful  Republican  minority  in  the
Senate to sit quietly by and permit the creation of a banking
system, the absolute control of which, to begin with, would
be  in  the  hands  of  men  all  appointed  by  a  Democratic
President.” 
The banking industry was presumed to have a voice in
the  boards  of  directors  of  the  regional  Federal  Reserve
Banks, which represent their member banks. Each regional
board consists of nine members. The Federal Reserve Board
of Governors controls the appointment of three directors.
The remaining six directors are elected by their member
banks  with  three  directors  representing  the  interests  of
stockholding banks and the other three as representatives 
of nonbanking activity like agriculture, commerce, or indus-
trial  sectors.  E.W.  Kemmerer,  a  Princeton  University
economist,  argued  in  1922  that  the  term  “federated”  was
applied to the structure of these boards because they were
organized  in  a  way  that  would,  “1)  recognize  the  public’s
dominant interest in matters of broad policy; would 2) recog-
nize  the  dominant  interest  of  the  bank  and  the  banker’s
business customer in the narrower banking questions, such
as the goodness of paper against which advances were to be
made, the amounts to be loaned individual member banks,
the quality of open-market investments, and the like; and 
would 3) permit of a democratic control among the member
banks of this banking business.” 
Bryan  and  other  populist  Democrats  at  the  time  also
would  have  been  familiar  with  the  federated  agricultural
cooperative  structure,  which  was  particularly  prevalent 
in the Midwest. In 1915, there were more than 5,400 agricul-
tural  cooperatives  in  the  United  States  with  more  than
650,000 members. This type of organizational structure was 
promoted by Edwin Nourse, an economist trained at the
University of Chicago. Nourse, who grew up on a small farm
in  Illinois  and  eventually  served  as  chairman  of  the  first
Council of Economic Advisers under President Truman, was
staunchly  opposed  to  monopolies  and  believed  that  local
cooperatives could force agribusiness firms to behave more
competitively by achieving scale through a federated system. 
The  division  of  power  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Act
between the Federal Reserve Board and the regional Federal
Reserve  Banks  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  U.S.  central
banking system. Since 1913, the System’s inherent regional
structure has been able to remain in place with only a few
revisions.  Some  restructuring  occurred  during  the  Great
Depression. The Banking Act of 1933 redefined the Federal
Reserve’s powers and the Banking Act of 1935 established
the FOMC. The “accord” of March 3, 1951 between the U.S.
Treasury and the Federal Reserve solidified the notion of 
the  independence  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  within 
the government. 
Federated Tensions and Resilience
The relationship between the local and national organiza-
tions  in  any  federated  structure  is  complex  and  contains
inherent tensions. The sustainability of federated systems
requires  that  all  local  organizations  remain  “loyal”  to  the 
system. For example, if local cooperatives conducted most
of their business outside of their federated system, it would
threaten  the  viability  of  their  regional  organization  and 
ultimately the entire federated structure. 
In the case of the Federal Reserve, this loyalty manifests
itself as speaking with one voice on policy decisions after
they have been made. Although FOMC votes are recorded
and  dissents  are  noted,  the  final  decision  is  formally 
supported by all Reserve Bank presidents. Paul M. Warburg,
a member of the first Federal Reserve Board, wrote in 1930, 
“A  regional  system  that  is  to  operate  successfully  must
remain a balanced system. That is to say, the Reserve System
must be under the leadership and direction of the Reserve
Board;  but  with  a  generalship  on  the  part  of  the  Board 
that  does  not  rest  on  the  assertion  and  bureaucratic  or 
dictatorial exertion of its legal powers but on the reserve
banks’  full  confidence  in  the  competence,  fairness,  and
impartiality of the Board, and on the clear recognition by
the reserve banks of a coordinating leadership by a Board
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seeking their harmonious cooperation as indispensable to
the successful and undisturbed functioning of the System.” 
The fundamental tension in any federation stems from
the potential incompatibility between maximizing benefits
derived from the national organization and maximizing local
benefits. If local benefits can be increased by doing business
outside the federation, the local organization has to weigh
those  potential  gains  against  possibly  smaller  benefits
derived  from  a  weaker  federated  system.  In  the  extreme
case, if a local organization fails to derive substantial bene-
fits from the federated system, they are better off operating
“disloyally,” which is to say as a truly independent organiza-
tion. This extreme case is hard to imagine in the case of the
Federal Reserve System, because the regional Banks are 
legally bound to the System — they cannot set their own
monetary policy, for example. However, it is also important to
distinguish between loyalty to the policy decisions made by the
System and allowing a difference of opinion about monetary
policy and theory to be expressed by each regional Bank.  
As Warburg recognized in 1930, the relationship between
the Board and the Reserve Banks is complicated by all of 
the  factors  that  made  the  European  central  bank  model
inappropriate to the United States, such as the “vast expanse
of our country; the immensity and diversity of its resources
and interests; the complexities of our political life and of a
decentralized system of thousands of individual banks; and
the existence of stock exchanges and industries of towering
strength,  standing  outside  of  the  System’s  immediate 
control” to avoid interference. 
The federated structure, however, has some significant
comparative advantages in the face of diverse local condi-
tions. The primary advantage in comparison to alternative
centralized structures is that it allows the local affiliates or
organizations to retain their flexibility when serving their
unique local markets. For example in the nonprofit sector, a
federated  model  of  governance  has  allowed  YMCAs  in 
different  countries  and  communities  to  offer  diverse 
programs that meet local needs. In the case of the Federal
Reserve System, it allows each Reserve Bank to respond to
local conditions when regulating their member banks and
providing technical assistance to local communities. 
The federated structure also supports the flow of local,
independent information and opinions upward within the
organization.  In  the  case  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  each
Reserve Bank collects its own economic data and informa-
tion that is used to define an independent monetary policy
perspective. Each Reserve Bank president provides policy
opinions  at  FOMC  meetings.  A  centralized  structure
would  not  provide  the  same  incentives  for  independent
information and opinions from each region. Instead, policies 
would be made centrally and funneled down through the
organization. Although this type of decisionmaking may be
less  costly  in  some  sense,  such  centralized  policymaking
might  not  generate  or  accommodate  diverse  opinions  as
effectively as the current structure and thus might result in
uninformed policies. 
Federated structures are also often criticized for opera-
tional  inefficiencies.  For  example,  local  affiliates  may
operate their own IT and payment systems or maintain dif-
ferent accounting standards. These types of inefficiencies
are avoided in centralized structures where uniform systems
are typically adopted by headquarters and all branches. In
the case of the Federal Reserve, some system-wide opera-
tions have been adopted. For example, all 12 banks share the
same payment, contracting and IT platforms. 
Why a Federated Structure Still Matters
During a time of crisis, it is common to want to undertake
major  policy  changes  in  order  to  prevent  another  from
occurring. However, in a rush to reform the national bank-
ing system, there may be a tendency to dismiss the broader
rationale behind the central bank’s organizational structure.
Arguments for keeping a federated structure for the United
States’ central banking system still have the same credibility
in 2010 as they did in 1913 when the structure was created. 
Each  regional  Reserve  Bank  in  the  Federal  Reserve
System has a unique culture and perspective that reflects its
district. The federated structure has allowed each regional
Bank  to  maintain  its  unique  policy  voice  while  also 
realizing  the  efficiencies  of  consolidated  operations. The 
diversity  of  opinion  within  the  Fed  continues  to 
generate solid, consensus-driven policy decisions and can be
seen  as  one  of  the  strongest  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
current structure.  RF
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